The People's Project

Bramley-Moore Dock – Planning Addendum

Security Planning Report

September 2020

BURO HAPPOLD

The Peoples' Project

Security Planning Report

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Glossary

Term	Definition
Access Control	The control of pedestrian and vehicle movement through the implementation of physical and technical security measures
Alarm System	Combination of sensors, controls, and enunciators (devices that announce an alarm via sound, light, or other means) arranged to detect and report an intrusion
Asset	Any tangible or intangible value to the organisation (people, property, information)
Back-of-House	Operational and working areas within an organisation, which are not accessible to the general public e.g. staff offices, plant spaces storage, loading bay, catering
Closed Circuit Television	See video surveillance system
Crime Prevention through Environmental Design	An approach to reducing crime or security incidents through the strategic design of the built environment, typically employing organizational, mechanical, and natural methods to control access, enhance natural surveillance and territoriality, and support legitimate activity
CPNI	Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure
Defence-in-depth	The strategy of forming layers of protection for an asset from the outside in
Denial	Frustration of an adversary's attempt to engage in behaviour that would constitute a security incident
Design Basis Threat	Is derived from a threat assessment, where the threat described within the Threat and Risk Assessment, is refined to account for other issues (technical, economic, and political issues), and the particular requirements of planning for system design. This is assessed against 4 themes: 1. Internal and / or external adversaries 2. Malicious acts leading to unacceptable consequences 3. Attributes and characteristics 4. Design and evaluation
Detection	The act of discovering an attempt (successful or unsuccessful) to breach a secured perimeter (such as scaling a fence, opening a locked window, or entering an area without authorisation)
Electronic Access Control System	Electronic access control is a system that enables an authority to control access to areas and resources in a given physical facility. An access control system, within the field of physical security, is generally seen as the second layer in the security of a physical structure
Front-of-House	Areas of an organisation which are accessible to the guests and visitors e.g. entrances, concourses, micro-brewery, clubs catering and beverage areas
Inaccessible Void	A space that is not intended to allow access once construction or fabrication is complete
Intrusion Detection System	A system that uses a sensor(s) to detect an impending or actual security breach and to initiate an alarm or notification of the event
Lighting	Degree of illumination; also, equipment, used indoors and outdoors, for increasing illumination (usually measured in Lux or foot-candle units)
Loss Prevention Standard	Industry best practise guide to physical security standards for buildings that provide a resistance and delay to forcible attack against a range of both hand and battery-operated tools
Natural Surveillance	The monitoring of the behaviour, activities or other changing information, usually of people and often in a suspicious or conspicuous manner, part of the Secured by Design principles
Perimeter Protection	Safeguarding of MSG Sphere perimeter boundary
Physical Security	That part of security concerned with physical measures designed to safeguard people; to prevent unauthorised access to equipment, facilities, material, and documents and to safeguard them against a security incident
Physical Security Measures	A device, system, or practice of a tangible nature designed to protect people and prevent damage to, loss of, or unauthorised access to assets
Policy	A general statement of a principle according to which an organisation performs its business functions
Procedure	Detailed implementation of instructions for carrying out security policies; often presented as forms or as lists of steps to be taken prior to or during a security incident
Proprietary Information	Valuable information, owned by an organisation or entrusted to it, which has not been disclosed publicly; specifically, information that is not readily accessible to others, that was generated or collected by the owner at considerable cost, and that the owner seeks to keep confidential
Protection-in-depth	The strategy of forming layers of protection for an asset
Risk	A risk is a possible event, which could cause a loss, change or possibility of danger, loss, injury or other adverse consequence
Risk Assessment	The process of assessing security-related risks from internal and external threats to an entity, its assets, or personnel
Risk Management	A business discipline consisting of three (03) major functions: 1. Loss prevention 2. Loss control 3. Loss or indemnity
Security Measure	A practice or device designed to protect people and prevent damage to, loss of, or unauthorised access to equipment, facilities, material, and information
Security Vulnerability	An exploitable security weakness
Surveillance	Observation of a location, activity, or person either technically or naturally
Threat	An action or event that could result in a loss; or an indication that such an action or event might take place
Token	An electronically encoded device (a card, key-fob, etc.) that contains information capable of being read by an electronic device placed within or at the entry and exit points of a protected facility
Uninterrupted Power Supply (UPS)	A system that provides continuous power, to an alternating current (AC) line within prescribed tolerances; protects against over-voltage conditions, loss of primary power, and intermittent brownouts (darkness resulting from the extinction of light). Usually utilised in conjunction with an emergency generator
Vulnerability	The susceptibility of a target to be affected by a threat

1 Introduction

1.1 Post Submission Addendum

As this security planning report forms part of the wider planning application submission and is potentially available within the public domain, no security drawings, operational overlays or operational security plans are included. The full security strategy report (BMD01-BHE-ZZ-RP-E-680360 Dated 22 May 2020) refers. Merseyside Police have further reviewed this report and are happy with the contents.

Since the security planning report and full security strategy have been issued, Merseyside Police, specifically the Counter Terrorist Team have confirmed (08,04,2020) via email "that there are no formal objections to the continued design and planning for the New Everton FC BMD stadium build".

Liaison with the CTSA and DoCO from the Merseyside Police was established to assist in the compilation of the security risk assessment at Stage 1+ (June 2017), which has formed the foundation for the developing security strategy.

Subsequent to the submission of a full planning application (LPA ref. 20F/0001) in December 2019, the club has reviewed the proposed stadium design and layout in light of consultation responses received during the post-submission period to date. The new scheme is compliant with relevant statutory planning and legislative guidance and the security strategy intent remains agreed and as previously reported.

The submission of an updated scheme therefore captures the following design-based changes:

1.1.1 Massing

- Removal of the multi-storey carpark (MSCP) and redesign of the western elevation to incorporate a new elevated stepped amenity area/public realm, with sheltered access/egress to the west stand turnstiles located below (underneath the elevated stepped plaza). There are no considered security issues relating to the new western elevated area. The area is adequality monitored by CCTV, and on non-match days, will be furthered monitored by patrolling staff. The club shall secure the site during the evening or for a specific security reason at the eastern secure line. Operational security items are not covered in this report.
- On a match-day there will be security checks conducted on eastern site boundary (internal to BMD site).
- Relocation of the Photovoltaic (PV) canopy previously above the surface car park to the west of the proposed water channel to the south stand of the stadium roof.
- Relocation of Outside Broadcasting (OB) compound and sub-station to northern extent of west quay
- Wind mitigation redesign due to removal of MSCP and optimisation of northern and southern solutions (allows for better CCTV and natural surveillance views).
- Redesign of the western elevation has resulted included provision of a large glazed area above the entrance portal.

1.1.2 Landscaping

- As a result of relocation of OB compound and sub-station to northern extent of west quay – a wider public realm area is provided along river front
- The three pedestrian openings through the existing Regent Road Wall have been further reduced in width to provide a better crowd flow out of the stadium and reduce congestion in other areas. The secure line as per the submitted scheme remains extant.

1.1.3 Carparking

- As a result of relocation of OB compound and sub-station to northern extent of west quay, the surface carparking is relocated to the south.
- Removal of the multi-storey carpark has resulted in reduction of the total number of car parking spaces provided.
- A vulnerability of blast from the MSCP against the west stand has been greatly minimised by its removal.

1.2 General

This security planning report has been prepared by BuroHappold Engineering on behalf of Everton Stadium Development Limited (hereafter 'Everton' or 'the Club') to inform a full planning application for the proposed development for a 52,888-seat capacity stadium with associated facilities and infrastructure at Bramley-Moore Dock ('BMD'), Liverpool.

This report informs the Design & Access Statement ('DAS') prepared by the Project Architect and is based on a thorough understanding of both the reviewed and agreed threats and resultant risks (and their mitigations) by Everton and Merseyside Police (Counter Terrorist Team and Design Out Crime team). In terms of the application site, the following provide a basis of design for security:

- Access for the scheme is via Regent Road only through managed vehicle access control points (VACP). There are no access rights through Liverpool Waters (at present or likely at the time of the stadium opening
- The Grade II listed Regent Road wall is a substantial defensive structure on the eastern site boundary behind which is located the proposed stadium scheme. Insertions into the wall are however required to provide suitable pedestrian access to the site
- There is no access to the site from the north via United Utilities Wastewater Treatment Plant or operational port (Sandon Half-Tide Dock). Security fencing demarcates the current northern site boundary
- There is a narrow road network in the vicinity of application site. However, Regent Road is a long linear road (north – south alignment) which presents the potential for high speed traffic. Therefore, whilst the Regent Road wall forms a defensible boundary, it will be necessary for temporary vehicle mitigations to be in place to minimise vehicle access and high-speed movement / access to the BMD site
- The River Mersey is an inaccessible water body for a seaborne attack vector and Nelson Dock is an inaccessible waterway. Additionally, the River Mersey wall runs along the western edge of the site and has a concrete crown wall on top with a crest level of 8.12m AOD along most of the application site. This crest is approximately 1.5m higher than the adjacent ground level of the BMD. The crown wall continues southward beyond Nelson Dock to the entrance to Salisbury Dock.

1.3 Guidance and Objectives

This report seeks to demonstrate that the proposed stadium scheme has a compliant security strategy which has been developed in accordance with:

- National Planning Policy Framework (NPPF);
- The Stadium Green Guide – 2018 6th Edition paragraph 3.1 allowing the security design to assist with Safety and security planning, Counter Terrorist plan, security overlay, communications and control (24/7 control room and event control room), CCTV provision, CCTV assessment of need through the Security Risk and Threat Assessment; and

- Merseyside Police, Counter Terrorist Security Advisor (CTSA) and Design Out Crime Officer) recommendations.

The NPPF is a material consideration in decision-taking and therefore paragraph 95a (*Chapter 8 - Promoting healthy and safe communities*) is relevant given that it details:

> *'planning decisions should anticipate and address possible malicious threats especially in locations where large numbers of people are expected to congregate…the layout and design of developments should be informed by the most up-to-date information available from the police and other agencies about the nature of potential threats and their implications. This includes appropriate and proportionate steps are taken to reduce vulnerability, increase resilience and ensure public safety and security'.*

The principal objective of this report is therefore to demonstrate that all aspects of security have been given the highest consideration and that qualified security consultants have informed the design from the earliest stages resulting in appropriate, agreed and effective mitigation measures and strategies. The security strategy includes, but is not limited to:

- Pedestrian and vehicle access control / screening, search and validation
- Hostile vehicle mitigation measures
- Surveillance
- Intruder detection
- Lighting
- Security control facilities
- Identification of the key threats and vulnerabilities identified in the Threat and Risk Assessment.

1.4 Proposed Operation Overview

The proposed stadium will be subject to the following uses:

- Football matches (potentially 28 games per season subject to the Club's progress in Domestic and European cup competitions);
- Stadium Hospitality Events / Tours – use of the facilities within the stadium for conferences, exhibitions, stadium tours. A restaurant within the hospitality area of the proposed western stand will be publicly accessible along with a café within the east stand. A Club shop and ticket office are also proposed within the east stand
- Non-football sporting/non-sports events

All vehicle access will be controlled via the Vehicle Access Control Point (VACP) at the North East entrance. Access is granted via the security operators in the security hut who will be via secure communications with the operators in the security control room, providing operations to the secure line.

The public realm areas around the stadium will be publicly accessible at all times. However, at the outset, security gates and boundary treatments are included in the design should the need arise as a result of a security event (likewise in the event of persistent anti-social behaviour).

During football and major event periods, there will be limited vehicle movement within the site. Vehicles such as hospitality and team coaches will access / egress the site, at specified times pre and post event when it is safe to do so.

Pedestrian access during football and major event periods will be controlled through the secure line where a scalable screening/search programme will occur. Authorised vehicles, once verified, will enter the site to park in the surface car park (west of the proposed new water channel) up to a pre-determined time prior to kick off, and before the hard road closures are in place and operational.

During silent hours, (when all events have concluded, cleaning and waste removal completed, including all staff having left, the site), it will be deemed secure with no vehicle access until a pre-determined time in the normal day-to-day operations.

2 Pre-Application Consultation

The Merseyside Police (Counter Terrorist Security Advisor (CTSA) and Design out Crime Officer (DoCO)) have been consulted frequently throughout the design process. The key security issues facing the proposed stadium arise from crime typical of the local area (general, anti-social behaviour and opportunistic crime) and the management of large numbers of different user groups. A security combined police and Liverpool City Council (LCC Planning / Building Control) meeting occurred early in the design process at Stage 2 and further LCC meetings have occurred with other members of the Design Team (DT). BuroHappold, as the Club's security consultant on the stadium project, has maintained liaison with Merseyside Police throughout all design phases.

The meetings with the Merseyside Police have resulted in a series of minutes being produced (not included in this security planning report) that pertain to sensitive matters, but in relation to security, have provided a series of proportionate recommendations which have been included in the overall security design (as per the full planning application).

Liaison with the CTSA and DoCO from the Merseyside Police was established to assist in the compilation of the security risk assessment at Stage 1+ (June 2017), which has formed the foundation for the developing security strategy.

The involvement of the CTSA and DoCO has been a key strand in the development of the security strategy to ensure that terrorist and crime prevention concerns are discussed and addressed. As the design progresses in accordance with approved standards, assurance will be maintained through the identification of security products, contractors and project management of installation.

During football and major event periods, the proposed stadium site will be classed as a Crowded Space and so counter terrorism measures are essential with protection from hostile vehicles identified as one of the key mitigation measures required.

Whilst the NPPF does not make specific recommendations on the above, the CPNI states that premises may be subjected to a wide range of malicious threats and that such locations (similar to this site) attract high densities of users which may be targeted by terrorists. Therefore, this stadium is one such development as noted above by the Merseyside CT team.

The security aim from the outset is to deliver elegant, cost-effective and flexible solutions which meet the needs of a wide range of users, which complement the aspirations of the Club/stakeholders. The Security design process has been developed to ensure that potential security-related vulnerabilities are considered across a range of activities and processes and that, where applicable, physical, personnel, cyber and cross-cutting security measures are properly embedded.

Robust decisions need to be made regarding when and where protective security measures are required. The decision-making process also needs to consider the type and extent of measures that are appropriate and proportionate to the risks, factoring in the decreasing separation between the physical and technological aspects within the built environments of the stadium, infrastructure and services.

The proposed new stadium scheme has therefore benefited from a consistent, clear approach to threat & risk through an agreed threat and risk assessment. A tailored approach has been adopted by firstly creating a bespoke framework for the client taking into account threats from the operating environment as well as specific threats associated with the project, design and end use. A clear description of this threat is an essential prerequisite for assured and effective physical protection. A physical protection system design shall be scalable to meet emerging threats.

2.1 Layered Security

2.1.1 Defence in Depth

Physical security involves a number of distinct security measures which form part of a 'defence in depth' approach to security, and which must take account of the balance between prevention, protection and response. Physical security measures or products, such as locks and doors, are categorised according to the level of protection offered.

Successful security is most effective when implemented on a number of geographic layers. In terms of HVM, layers can feature access control and vehicle management on a district level, design of approach routes, further vehicle management and stand-off distances against the stadium facade and finally, control of stand-off distances and secure threshold design to the immediate vicinity of the asset(s).

The 'layered' approach to physical security starts with the protection of the asset(s) at source and then proceeds progressively outwards to include the stadium, plaza, BMD site and the immediate surroundings. Here the approach routes, parking areas, utilities/services beyond the perimeter are also considered. To ensure appropriate physical security controls relevant to the proposed new stadium, the following must be considered:

- The impact of loss of the site or asset
- The level of threat
- The vulnerability
- The value of the assets

Security in depth should be applied to protect the new stadium and its assets and mitigate security risk, based on the following principles:

- Deterrence - Depth and layered protection for valuable assets, and effective security controls, will deter those who may be looking to commit crimes or to cause a security incident
- Detection - Depth and layered security provides time and space for the detection of breaches in security and unauthorised access
- Delay - As for detection, security layers impose a delay on those committing crimes or security breaches, increasing the risk of detection and being caught by those responding to the incident
- Response - Layered security which provides time for an effective response to incidents or alarms
- Recovery - Protective layers to support incident recovery.

2.2 User Groups

The proposed new stadium would attract / sustain a range of different user groups including:

- Staff – permanent, temporary, contractors, full-time and part-time event specific (stewards for example)
- Premium guest/fans – event and hospitality, pop-up event
- Contractors including Northern Utilities which may require access 24/7 (including event periods)
- Site Visitors – pedestrians passing through or enjoying public realm spaces and wider attractions such as the Grade II listed Hydraulic Engine Room (Hydraulic Tower) which is proposed to be converted into an exhibition/cultural centre
- Stadium visitors – Club shop, ticket office and restaurant/café facilities
- Deliveries – food and beverage, general and waste removal
- All fans and visitors including those with accessibility needs

2.3 The Proposed Stadium Scheme

As detailed in the introduction, the application site has good locational features to maximise security given that it is bounded to the east by a large (substantial height / width) Grade II listed granite-sett stone wall (Regent Road), the River Mersey to the west (beyond substantial sea wall), operational port uses to the north (United Utilities Waste Water Treatment Plant) and to the south by Nelson Dock (large water-body with vacant quaysides).

As the submitted application drawings identify, the proposed stadium is to be orientated north-south with a significant public realm / fan zone plaza extending to the Regent Road wall. Vehicular and pedestrian access to the site from Regent Road would be via two existing entrances to the south and north in addition to three new pedestrian-only accesses through the wall. A match-day management plan with vehicular road closures will need to be set in place to allow for the anticipated pedestrian flows to circulate safely, while vehicular traffic would be allowed before and after the road closures.

There is a surface car park located to the west of a new water channel (non-navigable as isolated from the wider dock system by virtue of existing and proposed isolation structures).

A security booth is located internal to the site at the northern vehicle access control point. From this location, all vehicles entering the site will be validated.

In terms of the internal layout of the stadium:

- There are two security control rooms (SCRs). The day-to-day 24/7 SCR located at ground floor and the event SCR located at Level 02
- The player's facilities will reside in the lower level of the west stand (main stand). The main west stand provides a hospitality offer on all levels where patrons will enjoy both premium seats and views to the pitch as well as over the River Mersey
- The lounges provided have been divided into separate types to provide for the range of hospitality offer anticipated
- A Club shop has been proposed at the main general admission entry at the east stand, in a prime location from the fanzone plaza. There are also pop-ups (permanent and non-permanent) located in the external fan zone area. A publicly accessible café (non-match / major event days) is proposed at first-floor level within the hospitality area
- The Main Box Office and ticket collection area is located on the South East corner facing Nelson Dock
- Food and beverage (F&B), programmes and betting stalls/concessions have been allocated throughout the concourses to be able to cover the fan demand during match days.
- Due to the access and security strategy, the home fans General Admissions (GA) turnstiles will be at the base of the stadium, with separation of home and away fans
- The away fans GA entrance/turnstiles area is located on the North East quadrant facing the United Utilities waste water treatment plant.

The security strategy includes scalable measures that can be raised or lowered at the direction of the proposed stadium security team and has been formed following the completion of a full security threat and risk assessment. In its development, there has been co-ordination with other disciplines and stakeholders involved in the design stages. Due to the sensitivity of the information contained within the threat and risk assessment, specific details have not been included in this report.

2.4 Design and Access

The security strategy will provide a safe and secure environment for staff, players and fans reducing the opportunity for crime, the fear of crime, and ensuring the confidentiality and privacy of business functions. The security strategy will provide for the delivery of high-profile scalable security services, which will be commensurate to the prevailing threat levels. Therefore, there will be an overt presence of security personnel (stewards), physical features, technology, including procedures to be followed, which will act as a deterrent whilst generating a feeling of safety.

2.5 Integrated Approach

Coordination has been undertaken with other disciplines, including (but not limited to) transportation and crowd flow specialists, lighting, MEP, accessibility consultants and fire strategy consultants, along with extensive coordination with the landscape and architectural teams, to ensure that security is integrated into each strand of the design.

2.6 Security Objectives

The security objectives are:

- Protection of life
- Protection of core operational processes and property
- Prevention of all crime events and to minimise their impacts if realised
- Reduction of business interruptions – resilience of power, telecommunications and IT
- Preservation of essential services – to allow continued business operations

The opportunities for crime have been minimised through careful design, with few places hidden from natural observation; those that remain will be treated with lighting and CCTV. The design will ensure that people will congregate in those spaces, where both natural and remote surveillance is provided.

During non-event periods, security will be maintained to ensure that there is an absence of opportunities for crime or anti-social behaviour. Remote surveillance monitoring supported by overt security patrols will continue without any noticeable differences. Throughout event mode, hostile vehicle mitigation measures will remain in defensive mode (secure) to prevent unauthorised vehicle access as well as providing an effective and protective standoff to the stadium façade whilst also ensuring a safe environment for pedestrians internal to the site environs. Fig 2-1 shows the standoff distances from the façade to the secure line at BMD wall



Figure 2—1 Standoff from façade to secure line (when enforced)

The table below highlights the key issues facing the proposed new stadium during both non-event and event periods and mitigation measures.

Table 2—1 – key issues event & non-event periods

Key Periods	Key Issues	Mitigation
Non–Event Periods Day to day operations Conferences, Stadium Tours, School visits etc	• Surveillance • Crime prevention and incident response • Vehicle access control (validation)	• CCTV coverage • Security patrols • 24 hours (day-to-day Security Control Room • Non-security rated vehicle barriers (internal road areas/plaza) for parking management • Security Booth at Northern vehicle entrance with rising arm barrier • HVM rated measures (red line boundary) secure during silent periods
Event Periods Football Matches	• Surveillance • Crime prevention and crowd management • Protection from hostile vehicle intrusion	• CCTV coverage • Security staff • Event Security control Room • Stewards • Signage • Vehicle security barriers (in the secure position) • Validation and ticket scan of all fans • Search as required • Bag drop (for bags larger than A4 in size)

2.7 Access, Ownership and Surveillance

Access points into the stadium have been kept to the required minimum in line with the Club's and security principles requirements, but aligned to the desired crowd flow numbers, including emergency and evacuation events. Furthermore, the external entrances and exits are in line with the stadium design for separate staff, visitor, home and away fan bases, deliveries, cash movement, hospitality/fans and players (home & away). The stadium entrances during operational periods will be well illuminated and during non-event periods will be free access (working day for visitors to appointed reception areas), on lockdown capability or operated from staff access cards or permit to work for contractors.

The external concourse areas (nelson and wellington concourses) are both monitored by CCTV, as is the new western elevated plaza and area underneath leading to fan, hospitality, media and players entrance.

Internally, the layout has been designed to ensure that there is clear delineation between public (concourse, food & beverage and bowl seating areas), semi-public (event periods), private areas (Back of House- BoH), media, players, management, Security Control Rooms (SCRs) and cash loading, through vertical and linear separation; enhancing a sense of ownership and responsibility. The 'internal street 'scene of the concourses have also been designed to provide good natural surveillance, with clear lines of sight, supported by high levels of lighting and CCTV coverage.

Access to BoH areas will be for authorised staff, players, management, hospitality and escorted visitors only. This separation has enabled the development of a clear security zoning concept for the main modes of operation (normal business hours, events use and fully closed down), which will be enforced through the deployment of technical security systems via the SCRs, and during events, will include the use of stewards.

Delivery access is via the northern vehicle entry/exit road leading to the North West corner of the stadium ground floor storage area, which is located next to the loading dock security space.

In order to reduce ambiguity of movement and use; clear signage will direct visitors to their respective entrances (stands, home and away entrances). There will be a clear concept of defensible space during all modes of stadium operation, albeit achieved through different physical measures, security systems and operational processes.

The table below highlights the key issues facing the applicant in relation to site access and movement of people, along with the associated matters and mitigation measures.

Table 2—2 – Site access key issues

Key Issues	Associated Matters	Mitigation
Access Points	• Number kept to a minimum (GA turnstiles in line with crowd flow requirements)	• All façade doors security rated in relation to the space protection
Personal Screening	• All persons entering the site during event periods will be screened/validated & searched	• Search of persons via Walk Through Metal Detectors (WTMD) and rummage of bags prior to bag-drop (all bags larger than A4 in size)
Vehicle Screening	• All vehicles entering access and egress points will be screened/validated. • No search under normal threat scenarios/circumstances	• Vehicle security barriers, vehicle screening facility and controls conducted by security personnel • Deployment of canines will be a part of the screening /search process.
Control of Access to Back of House	• Prevent unauthorised access	• Electronic access control systems • Stewards
Monitoring of Security Systems	• System failure • Lack of trained system operators	• Trained operators

2.8 Crime Prevention and Physical Protection

Specific areas of security risk have been mitigated through careful design and the deployment of physical protection measures.

Defined security lines between the Front of House (FoH) and Back of House (BoH) spaces is a critical strand of the strategy, which has been addressed adequately. In the BoH spaces, further physical features reduce the likelihood of unauthorised access. Those spaces, which accommodate assets, which are critical to the safety of occupants and activities within the proposed stadium, will be subject to enhanced access controls with access rights limited to relevant individuals based on their roles and status.

Remote surveillance throughout each part of the internal and external spaces will enable widespread coverage, which will allow monitoring of activities and personal behaviour enabling the security team to provide a rapid response when such action is required.

Countering the opportunities for acts of terrorism is paramount to the safety and security of BMD as this threat carries the greatest impact if realised, its fans and visitors, staff and contractors, and as such, a series of physical measures to reduce the likelihood or impact of attacks have been included within the design. Remote surveillance will act as a deterrence whilst assisting the security team to identify incidences of hostile reconnaissance or suspicious behaviour. Protection against vehicle intrusion will be provided by a hostile vehicle mitigation scheme along the redline boundary of the fan zone and Regent Road and during specific times during events, hard road closures enforced through the use of temporary security rated HVM located in strategic locations.

2.9 Integrated Security Strategy

In order to achieve the security objectives outlined above, a layered system of defensive measures consisting of physical and technical mitigations and measures commencing at the site boundary and continuing into the stadium building will be implemented to protect people and ensure continuity of activities (the operational process).

This layering system or "defence in depth" is achieved via the following principles:

- **Deter** - Persuade adversaries from conducting an attack through emphasis of the likelihood of failure and capture
- **Detect** - To identify threat or attack behaviours, and initiate an appropriate response to a threat or attack as early in the attack timeline as possible
- **Delay** - Maximising the time between the detection of an attack and the completion of an attacker's goals – thereby increasing the attack timeline and further increasing the chances of detection
- **Detain / Respond** - The ability to respond to an attack and, if appropriate, detain them before escape.

These four elements of the strategy can be achieved in a number of different ways but always rely on the integration of people, physical measures, technologies and procedures; without all four being intrinsically linked it will be impossible to truly eliminate vulnerabilities.

2.10 Security Partnership

A key component of the security strategy is the sharing of information and intelligence within the confines of the General Data Protection Regulations 2018 (GDPR). This is especially relevant to the sharing of information, which comprises of personal data, which in the context of a security partnership covers the sharing of information relating to persons suspected of criminal behaviour.

Security and the safety of people cannot be maintained in isolation and in order to be successful it has to cross boundaries. Everton have ongoing strong partnerships with each of the principal stakeholders (police etc.), each of which would in the event of an incident or because of crime or disorder have an impact on the activities within the footprint of the stadium site. Operational aspects of the partnership will be included in the Stadium Management Plan and subsequently the Venue Operations Manual (by others).

3 Threat and Risk Assessment

The purpose of the Security Threat, Risk and Vulnerability Assessment (STRVA) is to identify the threats and risks to the proposed stadium scheme and minimise vulnerabilities from criminal and terrorist elements. The RIBA Stage 3a design freeze will use key risks as a reference to determine if appropriate levels of physical and technical measures have been employed, which allows the presentation of an informed scheme for planning.

A Threat and Risk Assessment has been conducted for the application proposals at BMD and has taken on board intelligence and advice from the Merseyside Police CTSA and the DoCO, as well as statistics taken from the Police Crime Mapping Dashboard.

Areas of concern and activities that have been covered in the Threat and Risk Assessment include, without limitation: (the order listed is not indicative of any weighting):

Terrorist Activity

- Vehicle as a weapon attack
- Person borne improvised explosive devices
- Vehicle borne improvised explosive devices
- Other terrorist offences such as marauding attacks

Criminal Activity

- Theft
- Violence against the person
- Burglary
- Robbery
- Criminal Damage
- Other notifiable offences (including arson)
- Anti-Social Behaviour
- Graffiti

Failure of essential services

- Cyber attacks
- Loss of power
- Loss of IT infrastructure and security linkages

Terrorism is a very real and serious threat to the UK; at the time of writing the UK Government (MI5) Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre have set the current threat level for international terrorism in the UK at 'Severe'. This is, however, a general and blanket assessment. Threat levels are designed to give a broad indication of the likelihood of a terrorist attack. As a proposed sports stadium the application site / scheme would be classed as a crowded space. NB: All threats and risks are based on current data, rather than presumptive forecasting, with a recommendation that it be monitored and reassessed as an ongoing process throughout design with frequent police updates.

3.1 Summary

A number of risks have been identified and broad mitigation recommendations have been made.

This assessment has followed a Design Basis Threat approach and has been developed from a baseline analysis of the threats to the site and stadium. It has been established that there is a risk of crime, disorder and/or terrorism.

A strong operational approach to security will be adopted to increase control of access and therefore reduce the likelihood of unauthorised entry and the incidents that can stem from such exposure. The mitigation strategy will take an integrated approach where people, policies, systems, and physical security measures are combined to deliver an effective regime.

4 Security Design Principles

In accordance with NPPF para. 95a, crime prevention is an important consideration in the determination of the planning application. In accordance with the objectives of the security strategy, the following security design principles, which are supported by the Merseyside Police Force, have been incorporated into the proposed design as presented for planning:

- **Access and Movement** – Following the principle of providing convenience without comprising security, the parts of the site to which the public have access have defined routes via the pedestrian access point from Regent Road. There will be access and egress controls conducted by security personnel at the vehicle access and egress points. Access to the site, or parts of the site, will be restricted or prohibited during certain times
- **Structure** – The design of the stadium and the spaces, which will accommodate ancillary commercial uses, have been designed to allow all users to move about the external spaces without conflict. Back of house, spaces with electronic access control systems and appropriate physical features will only be accessible to those with rights to gain entry
- **Surveillance** – The fanzone plaza and roads around the stadium, including the concourse spaces have been designed to provide a high degree of natural surveillance achieved by ensuring that the landscaping does not obstruct the vision of those occupying the space. During the hours of darkness, the levels of illumination within each of the external spaces allows sufficient levels of illumination for natural as well as CCTV surveillance and through coordination with the BuroHappold Engineers (BHE) lighting consultants, the lighting is focused in the correct areas
- **Physical protection** –the protection of people and assets is an integral part of the design and subsequent operations. Physical protection will be provided at each of the access points to prevent unauthorised vehicular and unauthorised pedestrian access to the back of house spaces where strict controls are required to be enforced
- **Activity** – Through landscaping, architectural design and with multiple commercial outlets (referred to as 'pop-ups') during football and major event periods, the external and internal Front of House spaces will benefit from high volumes of pedestrian congregation. This leads to increased natural surveillance and reduces the opportunity for crime
- **Management and maintenance** – The design team have considered the management of the different support and business activities that will take place within the stadium and site. On the operational front, the Club's operations and management team is highly experienced in the operation of football events and the high standard exercised at Goodison Park will be maintained/enhanced at BMD.

Compliance with the scheme is an indication that a development has adequately addressed the issue of crime prevention.

4.1 External Furniture and Litterbins

As agreed, external furniture such as benches and planters will be of a robust vandal resistant design. Furniture will be fixed into the ground in order to prevent its theft and reduce the possibility of it being used for climbing or as a tool to break into the building, or for use as a weapon against rival fan bases.

To reduce the likelihood of drugs or offensive weapons being hidden, planters will be designed to include the use of small gauge meshing.

The proposed stadium scheme will use refuse sack holders attached to lighting columns for the use of clear refuse sacks.

Figure 4—1 waste refuse clear plastic sack

4.2 Event Periods

The management of crowds does not play a role in this report and will be covered in the Concept of Operations (CONOPS), completed by Everton staff. Nevertheless, it is worthy of note that the stadium will have at capacity of 52,888 people, and as such that the site falls within the definition of a 'crowded space'.

4.2.1 Match day staff

On match days at Goodison Park around 1,200 staff are present on site consisting of hospitality, media, hosting & catering, security, police and safety staff. It should be noted that match day staff does not exclusively mean staff employed directly by the Club. Match day staff encompass third party staff and in loose terms means anyone employed to work on match days at the stadium.

At Bramley-Moore Dock the Club estimates staffing levels to be around 2,000 people. A breakdown of this is provided below:

- 900 catering staff
- 200 Everton employees consisting of stadium operations, pitch staff, shop staff, hospitality and fan liaison
- 100 external media broadcast and non-broadcast media
- 800 staff consisting of stewards, security staff, police and ambulance.

H.M Government (the Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI) and the National Counter Terrorism Security Office (NaCTSO)) define 'crowded places' as 'those places where there may be a risk of a terrorist attack by the very nature that they are crowded places'. In essence, this is a reference to locations where significant numbers of people gather and thus, the location becomes an attractive target for terrorists. Counter measures are discussed elsewhere in this report.

As a consequence of the increased population within the site during certain event periods, the risk of crime (including terrorism) is raised. This requires an enhanced level of security personnel in the following areas: security control and event operations management room, FoH and BoH spaces, external spaces, and search and screening points.

4.2.1 Pedestrian Ingress

All fans will arrive at the application site on either foot (majority of arrivals), coach, private vehicle or taxi off Regent Road. However, there are limited arrivals by vehicle and any taxi drop off will be prior to the hard road closures once they are in use.

4.2.2 Turnstiles General Admission

- General Spectators: Turnstile locations are provided for General spectator to access the stadium building on Level 00
- Corporate and Hospitality spectators: ½ height turnstiles are provided on the central areas of the West and East concourses on Level 00
- Away Fans: Turnstiles for Away Fans are provided on the North East quadrant of the stadium building on Level 00.

4.2.3 Pedestrian Egress

All fans and guests will egress via the pedestrian entrances/exits onto Regent Road.

It is also noted that any hospitality members/guests who have parked at the venue will not be able to leave via vehicle for a period until it is safe to do so. This applies to anyone who is parked on site and includes blue badge holders.

4.2.4 Non-Event Periods

The public realm areas around the stadium will be accessible 24/7 and will therefore be subject to regular security patrols supported by remote surveillance. If there is a specific security reason (following advice) that the stadium site needs to be 'locked down' then gates proposed to the Regent Road entrances (existing and proposed) will enable this to happen. If anti-social behaviour / crime events occur, then the Club may seek to review access arrangements for the site outside of operational hours.

5 Security Zoning

In order to enable the development of the security strategies, each of the external and internal spaces have been reviewed in relation to the specific risks together with the category of people who are expected to be granted access.

Protection of people, assets and the stadium are a fundamental part of the Security Strategy. It seeks to allow freedom of movement into authorised areas whilst mitigating against criminal activity, including terrorism. This Chapter provides the philosophy of various user access through the highlighting of the security zones. In doing so, it provides descriptions of the zoning that the different categories of person, who will work and visit, within or deliver to the stadium.

The physical environments of the stadium have been designed so that it can be managed to reduce the risk of unwanted security events. Zoning is one component of physical security designed to reduce such risk. It should not be considered as a means that will eliminate risk, nor should it be considered as the only method to address risk. Instead, it shall be viewed as an integral component of the overall risk management strategy.

Zoning should promote a sense of ownership or territorial reinforcement, provide opportunities for natural surveillance and establish a clearly defined sequence of boundaries through which visitors, staff, or other stadium employees may or may not pass (those that have a business right to pass into or through a door or space).

Due to the varied occupants, business activities, security operations and more importantly the integration of technologies within the stadium, there is a requirement for a clearly defined set of security zones that the mitigation measures are measured, integrated and coordinated against.

The functional hours of occupants and their activities will differ, depending upon their movements and responsibilities.

The security zones and risk mitigation control measures provide a consistent and structured approach to determining:

- The business impact of people and physical assets
- The level of control required to:
    - Meet the threat environment
    - Give suitable protection to people (different fan base, players, staff and hospitality) and physical assets
    - Allow integration of players and fans when required per the Premier League (or other relevant bodies) guidance
- The types of controls that are suitable.

The primary outcomes of the zone's methodology are to give a scalable level of protection from:

- Unauthorised or covert access; and
- Forcible attack.

The table below details the different security zone classifications and guidance on the types of spaces within each category.

Table 5—1 Defined Security Zones

Demarcation	Function / Description	Example
PUBLIC	A space accessible by the public which does not contain any access control provisions, however; **Soft and hard road closures will prevent vehicle access for a determined period during events.**	• Pedestrian pathways • Roads • Pedestrian links
SEMI - PUBLIC	A space where any member of the public can access freely, however, they will cross a physical barrier that is insecure at that time (non-event periods). This will include the western plaza	**During non-event** periods free access into the plaza to access various areas of the BMD site (external and as required internal, café, club shop, school and heritage areas. Access through the BMD wall may be denied for operational matters. **During event periods** – access into the plaza (fan zone) will require passing through a search regime (quantity of search (10%/50 or 100% of all people entering) via walk through metal detectors and rummage bag search. Searching % rate will be determined on a number of factors, i.e. police advice and the current threat environment, type of game (opposition)
SEMI - PRIVATE	Publicly accessible areas with enhanced security control measures, that can be segregated and operationally controlled, whilst maintaining access to other functional areas. May be a person (steward providing the access control) as they have the access card)	• Non-sensitive storage and cleaning staff areas • The stadium (general spaces-concourses) • Invited restaurant areas • Hospitality guest reception area • Hospitality Food and Beverage • BoH loading and delivery areas • Steward facilities • Some Private boxes • Media facilities • First aid spaces – public • Police holding areas
PRIVATE	Areas which are segregated from the public for operational reasons and are specifically managed with security control measures.	• Dedicated vertical transportation routes • MEP spaces • BoH areas (service areas and associated corridors) • Certain stadium offices • Players facilities (home & away) • Medical facilities - teams • Hospitality boxes • Police spaces • EFC administration/offices • Ticket areas (non-public)
RESTRICTED	Areas which are segregated from the public for operational reasons and are only entered by nominated personnel under strict approval controls, which are deemed critical to the business operation.	• Security Control Room(s) (24 hour and event) • Safe and cash storage areas • Security Equipment Room • LV/HV spaces • ICT spaces/PAVA • CBS and UPS spaces • Generator rooms

		• Essential and life-safety building infrastructure facilities

With the exception of the public spaces, each of the designated security zones will be subject to control of access; this may be by physical or technological means, or a combination. Both private and restricted zones will be subject to enhanced measures deploying currently available technology.

6 Vehicle Access and Hostile Vehicle Mitigation Measures

6.1 Vehicle Access

The application site has two vehicle access/exit locations at the north and south of the Regent Road boundary. These are referred to as the Northern and Southern Vehicle Access Control Points (VACP). Vehicles will use both the southern access points and the northern access points. The times stated below are only recommended, however times may vary operationally. The strategy is set out in significant detail within the Transport Assessment ('TA') submitted with the planning application. However, the following summarises the strategy from a security planning perspective.

The northern VACP has PAS 68/IWA-14 security tested and rated Hostile Vehicle Mitigation (HVM) measures to form an enclosed VACP. The outer line (Regents Road) has retractable bollards and the inner line a swing arm barrier.

6.2 Match Day / Major Events (Full Capacity Events)

At two (2) hours pre-match (kick-off):

- Soft vehicle closure to Regent Road will be in force. This will assist in securing the adjacent streets and aid pedestrian movement
- One (1) hour before kick-off, all vehicular access stopped with enforcement of temporary Hostile Vehicle Mitigation (HVM) measures; hard closure along Regent Road and Blackstone Street (A5054).
- The HVM measures on the BMD red-line boundary (site and Regent Road) will be in the secure position
- Note – emergency vehicle access permitted, team coaches permitted. The temporary HVM installation has the capability to allow access within 30 seconds for emergency vehicles.
- Vehicle hard road closures are removed at a time that is safe to do so post final whistle allowing vehicles to depart safely.

6.3 Non-match-day periods

Both the Southern and Northern VACPS will be in operation during non-match day periods. All delivery vehicles will use the Northern VACP. On a non-match/non-event day all vehicles (aside from refuse and emergency vehicles) will enter via the north-east entrance and exit via the south-east entrance.

6.4 Match Day

- Northern access for entry and exits from the surface car park
- Southern access exit for team coach and OBC.

All delivery vehicles will be validated before allowed to proceed through the VACP.

The latest series of diagrams show this.



Figure 6—1 Non-matchday activity



Figure 6—2 Match Movement Pre-Match



Figure 6—3 Matchday – Movement Kick Off



Figure 6—4 matchday Movement 30 minutes Post Match

6.5 Temporary HVM Measures

A system that allows pedestrian permeability and acts as a hostile vehicle mitigation (HVM) measure is proposed to minimise Vehicle as a Weapon (VaW) attacks for the crowded pedestrian approaches over the last leg of the journey to the stadium.

This will allow pedestrian permeability for the free movement of spectators to and from the proposed stadium, whilst the road closure system is in place.

It will allow managed vehicle access whilst the established road closure system is in place, for the controlled movement of:

1. Emergency service vehicles – Police, Fire and Ambulance (these will have the ability to pass through the temporary HVM as the passage route can be dismantled in 30 secs by a competent on-site (during the event) team
2. Local resident occupants and businesses (during certain periods)
3. Player and support staff coaches (60 minutes before kick-off)
4. OB 120 Minutes.

Consultation with the Club reveals that there will be no temporary HVM measures stored on site.

7 Search and Screening

The stadium security regime will operate a screening/validation regime covering every vehicle that enters the application site, and for specific threat scenarios, which will include certain events (fan person and items entering the stadium via the search and screening area on the Plaza).

Within the security industry, the terms Search and Screening are synonymous with one another and refer to the processes and technologies used to make sure that people, their belongings, and vehicles do not pose a threat to a site, its assets, and people within.

The tiered process is search and entry, and then access to the plaza and onto and through the turnstiles, via the use of a correct ticket. Access through the turnstiles to the stadium demise will be via QR/bar code on the ticket or phone app.

In pre-event communication, it will be made clear that security validation will take place and the right of entry will be refused if specified items are in a person's possession. Encouragement to not attend events with carried items such as bags (larger than A4) will assist in achieving high levels of flow through the screening lanes. Electronic signage conveying these messages will occur. However, it is fully appreciated that there will be both home and away fans that will have bags with them and therefore, depending upon the prevailing threat and screening regime, these will be searched prior to stadium admittance with anything larger than A4 (handbag for example) shall be deposited in specified bag drops located in the Plaza area. The bag drop areas will be located north and south in the plaza area.

7.1 Use of Canines

Dogs will be deployed for specific searches in relation to the detection of firearms or explosives. Handlers and dogs will be deployed in teams allowing one dog to rest whilst another works for a period of 20-30 minutes, which is considered the ideal timeframe for the level of performance required in security operations.

Providers of canine services will be required to prove that they are operating within the guidance provided by HM Government Detection Dog Guidance Notes in relation to both handlers and dogs.

Operations will be compliance with BS 8517-2 Security Dogs Part 2. All dog handlers will be required to have the current appropriate Security Industry Authority licence to cover their role.

7.2 Vehicle Screening

The term screening, in the context of incoming vehicle security, refers to the processes in place for the identification and verification of the vehicle, its occupants, and its contents/consignment. There are varying depths of screening that can be implemented depending on the requirements at the time – screening is not a 'one size fits all' process. These processes include, pre-scheduling deliveries, visual inspections by security officers, the checking of consignment packing/delivery notes against order forms, inspection and verification of vehicle occupant identification with photo ID, and, where applicable, inspection of any security seals for evidence of tampering.

Vehicle screening should answer the following questions:

- *Is the vehicle expected?*
- *Is the driver (and any other occupants) who they say they are?*
- *Does the consignment/delivery match what the Club have asked for? Again, is it expected?*

Screening does not have to be a lengthy process, but it does require dedicated space and physical measures in place to prevent vehicle access to the site before screening has been completed and accepted. The security staff located in the security booth at the northern VACP will validate/screen all vehicle access onto the site. The size of the vehicle access control point (from the Regent Road PAS 68/IWA-14 rated bollards to the swing arm barrier) is 34.6m in length. The average length of a cab (tractor + 6) and trailer is 14.5m.

Vehicle screening/search under certain precedents will take place at the Northern vehicle access point.

7.3 Searching

The term searching, in the context of incoming vehicle security refers to the processes and technologies used to physically inspect and confirm vehicles contents – or, specifically, the lack of an identified threat. In this case, weapons or a vehicle borne improvised explosive device (VBIED). The rationale to search will be at the discretion of the stadium management team, threat profile/environment or on advice from others, namely the police.

Searching requires a considerable amount of dedicated space and resources – human, technological and, if appropriate, canine. There is capacity for a limited amount of searching to take place at the northern VACP from Regent Road.

There are a number of different vehicle types that will be permitted access onto the site, which again can be divided into event and non-event periods. During match day events, during a determined period which will be set by the Club, the secure red-line boundary will become secure (active bollards in the raised position) and the stand-off is enacted from Regent Road.

7.3.1 Event periods – (considered the period that lends itself for an event)

- Premium badge holders/fans with accessibility requirements will be required to park in allocated surface parking spaces to the west of the new water channel once screened/validated. This validation will more than likely be against the driver and occupants rather than the vehicle. These vehicles will be required to be on site at a period before kick-off to allow access before the hard road closures are in operation.
- Team coaches – home and away – Operational overlay but arrive via the northern VACP. If arrive on site once the Hard road closures are in place, communications via the operations team to the security staff at the hard road closure will allow for their passage. Access through the hard road closures takes 30-60 seconds
- Permanent pop-up / concessions shall be searched prior to opening and temporary pop-ups and concessions entering the site on event days shall be screened and validated in advance of the soft and hard road closures being in operation.
- Media and outside broadcast vehicle as for 3 above.

7.3.2 Non-event periods

- Delivery vehicles – these shall be permitted entry to the site via the northern VACP once they have been accredited/screened. There will be no deliveries during event periods and when the soft and hard road closures are in force
- Visitors – visitors will be directed to parking areas.

Depending on the prevailing threats at any time, security personnel will be available to check all vehicles and occupants to confirm identity before access is permitted.

The HVM measures at the Northern vehicle access control point have been designed to create a sterile area for security screening/search as required. The table below highlights the key issues and mitigation measures for screening at the application site.

Table 7—1 Mitigation measures for screening

Key Issues	Purpose	Mitigation
Searching Objectives – When operational and in place	Prevention of deadly or hazardous items being imported into the stadium site	Human resources and technology (security arches and bag search) located at all entrances into the site on match days / major events.
Appropriate Through-Put Levels	Maintenance of pedestrian flows	• Trained and competent staff • Informative signage • Technology capable of handling high volumes
Pre-Event Communication	Reduction in the volume of guests in possession of bags	Outline details of the security screening procedure via the Club website
Use of Canines	Dogs deployed to detect firearms or explosives	• Trained handlers and dogs • Operating to British Standards and security industry licences
Vehicle Screening	All Vehicles to be screened/validated before entry to the site on lead up to events. All delivery vehicles will be screened / validated prior to entry	• Trained security personnel • Canines • CCTV coverage

8 Access Control

8.1 General

Security of the scheme and assets will be secured through the deployment of well-trained competent staff together with the implementation of access control points, which will range from gates/roller shutters, vehicle barriers, security rated door sets, electronic access control systems and manual keys and keyways.

Turnstile access is provided for General Admission (GA) via full height turnstiles. Hospitality entrance will be via ½ height turnstiles located in the entrance lobbies of the proposed east and west stands. Staff, stewards, caters and media will all gain access via their dedicated access points on the NW and SW facades using their authorised credentials.

8.2 Vertical Transport

A number of lifts stop at both guest areas and restricted spaces. To minimise the possibility of unauthorised entry for these lifts, access control measures will be implemented in one set of lifts in the west stand at each floor level. Access control to these lifts will be via stewards.

No other lifts will have access control, but BoH lifts are protected by the Private / Public (FoH and BoH) divide.

All lifts lobbies will be equipped with CCTV coverage.

Key Issues	Description	Mitigation
Access Controls	Physical and Technological	• Gates/roller shutters • Vehicle security barriers • Security rated door sets • Electronic access control systems • CCTV
Range of Users	Wide Range of Regular and Occasional Users	• Different levels of access rights relevant to role and status
Lifts	Capability to Control Lift Movement	• Electronic access control on relevant lifts • CCTV coverage of lift lobbies

9 CCTV

9.1 General

The main purpose of the CCTV system will be the real time monitoring of both internal and external spaces for rapid detection and response of any incidents that occur. As well as being a deterrent, cameras will have the capability to provide evidence that can be used for post incident analysis.

The deployment of CCTV closely aligns with the defined crime risks, providing partial deterrence and early detection of attempted, or actual, intrusion, as well as an aid in recognising and preventing anti-social behaviour, criminal and terrorist activity.

CCTV cameras shall cover the entrances and exits to the stadium and other areas that are critical to the safe management of events and to the overall security of the club's business. Images will be monitored in the relevant Security control rooms for suspicious activity.

In addition to security, CCTV footage will also be utilised for:

- Safety – to allow members of the security and event teams to monitor areas of potential concern
- Management Tool – to monitor spaces during events and other operations, which allows the Applicant to oversee multiple locations from a single monitoring point
- Incident Management – to assist with the management and control of an incident, supplying the incident commander (Police, Fire Officer or Club staff) with live and recorded images of the scene, ensuring an appropriate response can be delivered
- Reconnaissance – to actively search for a hostile actor / hostile reconnaissance

The system design will comply with the CCTV Data Commissioners requirements. Privacy settings will be set on external CCTV cameras to ensure that they cannot view private areas external to the BMD site in accordance with GDPR.

9.2 Control

The proposed CCTV system will be controlled and monitored by trained and competent operators as is the current practice at Goodison Park from within the security control room (both event and non-event periods).

10 Intruder Detection System

10.1 General

The intruder detection system deployed will add an additional layer of security to the stadium. Vulnerable spaces such as building entry points, plant spaces and staff-customer interface points will have intruder detection devices located in them to detect any malicious activity. This can be in the form of either passive detectors (such as motion sensors and door contacts) or in the form of user, actuated devices (i.e. panic alarm buttons).

10.2 Duress Alarm

Duress alarm points will be located within strategic locations.

If a duress alarm is activated in the security control room, the alarm will not emit sound at the activation location.

Table 10—1 IDS mitigations

Key Issues	Location	Consequential Issues
Intruder Detection- General	Building Entry Points Plant Spaces Staff-Customer Interface Points	Provides an additional protective layer Monitored in the security control room
Duress Alarm	Located at Strategic Points Monitored in the Security Control Room	Activation will not emit local sound

11 Lighting

The effective use of lighting for security will enhance the physical security protection provided in and around the proposed stadium and plaza areas. The BH specialist lighting consultants in co-ordination with the security consultants have ensured that the correct and uniform levels of lux are provided through the site.

Lighting is a central component of the crime prevention strategy and care has been taken to ensure that appropriate levels of illumination are provided during the hours of darkness for external spaces and at all times for the internal spaces. This has been achieved by co-ordination between the lighting and security specialist.

External lighting will be located at high levels, as lower levels of illumination do not provide sufficient volumes of light at the appropriate height to assist natural or remote surveillance.

Table 11—1 Lighting mitigations and locations

Key Issues	Location	Purpose / Mitigation
Lighting	Internal and External	• Assist both natural and remote surveillance • Component of crime prevention strategy • External lighting to be located at high level to provide appropriate Lux levels of illumination

12 Waste Management

Recycling and the collection of waste materials is a major security challenge.

Depending on the threat level, it may include operationally that the waste collection is subjected to security screening with handheld devices if it is to be transferred to the waste storage space to await collection.

The majority of waste will be taken to the Level 00 waste and recycling area in the north west corner of the proposed stadium, where there is sufficient space for two portable compactors (one for residual waste; one for dry mixed recyclables), as well as space for organics and glass bins. A significant proportion of waste will be generated in the GA concourses and Fan Zone and hospitality areas.

Waste collection vehicles will access the site via the northern access point and exit via the southern access point.

Bulk waste storage will be provided in the loading bay spaces. To reduce the opportunity for arson or the facilitation of stolen goods, waste storage spaces will be secured and subject to both access controls and CCTV coverage.

Table 12—1 Waste management mitigation

Key Issues	Mitigation	Consequence
Litter Bins	Security screening with handheld devices dependent upon threat level	
Bulk Waste Storage	Secured Space CCTV Coverage Electronic Access Controls	Reduce opportunity for arson or other criminal activity

13 Security Control Facilities

There are 2 security control rooms (SCR's), the day-to-day (24 hour) and the event SCR. These suites are restricted spaces and subject to the higher levels of physical security and access controls. Right of access will be restricted to security personnel, a limited group of managers based on status, role and business requirement, including during events – members of the emergency services, and stakeholders under escort.

As a critical part of the site, it is important that the rooms will be capable of operating in emergency situations or where there has been a power failure. This will include a fire rating, provision of UPS and emergency power and air conditioning.

Security control will provide continuous co-ordination of the delivery of security services and communication with security personnel. The security systems will be monitored from the event SCR during event periods, along with overall co-ordination of security and event management.

The respective roles will be:

- Day-to-day SCR – This facility will provide continuous co-ordination of the delivery of security. This will include access and egress of vehicles to the site, in coordination with the loading dock surveillance and security team and monitoring of access to BoH spaces. Communication with patrols will be a major part of the role. It will be continuously staffed with positions for up to three operators. It is from this room that the security supervisor will oversee operations.
- Event SCR – This space is BoH L02. This control will become the control for emergencies, those events which require additional resourcing, and the intervention of other agencies including the emergency services.
- Meeting Room space - This will allow meetings to be held at short notice in close proximity of the control room, thus enabling the attendees to receive real-time information. This location is close to the event SCR.

In emergencies, the event SCR will be capable of operating as a single co-ordinating and communications facility. Spatial considerations have been included within the design to allow for the temporary accommodation of other stakeholders e.g. police, fire, ambulance and local authority. This may become the police bronze control space during an incident.

Table 13—1 SCR locations and roles

Key Issues	Location	Roles
Security Controls	• Day-to-day SCR • Event SCR	• Co-ordination of routine security services • Co-ordination of security and operations during events
Meeting Room	Available in both locations	Meeting facility for internal and external meetings

13.1 Physical Protection

Physical protection will include security rated doors and walls. The 'air lock' system will include doors, which are rated to the appropriate security standard, as well as intruder detection systems and CCTV.

The space housing the security systems will conform to the appropriate security standards. Electronic access controls will be applied to the doors. Walls will comply with the relevant rating in accordance with CPNI advice.

There will be surveillance and audio recording capability within each of the control spaces for use in event of emergency.

Table 13—2 SCR requirements

Key Issues	Associated Matter	Mitigation
Doors	Security Rated	Appropriate security standard
Ventilation	Independent of Main HVAC System	Avoid contamination in the event of a hazardous chemical incident

13.2 Northern Vehicle Access Control Point

A security booth will be located at the northern vehicles access control point to provide validation and control of the non-event period rising arm barrier. No control of active HVM measures will occur from this location.

14 Void Certification

Void certification is a key tool in the risk management approach to security during the construction and operation of any high-profile building. This is particularly relevant to risers running throughout the structure.

Void certification will be carried out by competent personnel in accordance with a clear policy and process.

15 Staff

Personnel security is essential to the overall security of the scheme and as such will form a primary part of the security strategy. Everton will ensure that all staff irrespective of their role and status understand that security is of primary importance. As such, each individual will be expected to display behaviour, which supports the maintenance of security and, where a compromise is discovered, to act and draw it to the attention of the manager and/or the security team.

15.1 Recruitment

Staff recruitment provides an opportunity for those intent on committing crimes (including terrorism) to embed themselves into an organisation. For this reason, Everton will introduce measures, which reduce the likelihood of criminals taking up employment. In the most part, the current regime of permanent and temporary staff (stewards for example) will be retained, for those that are deemed new starters, vetting will commence at the application stage continuing through the interview stages to the final application stages. Human resources managers will be responsible for determining the structure and depth of the screening process.

The following steps are examples of some of the checks that may be undertaken or verified according to the role:

- Verify identity
- Confirm right to work in the UK
- Ensure that applicants complete a self-declaration criminal record form
- Basic, Standard or Enhanced criminal record disclosure if relevant to the job
- All academic qualifications
- Relevant professional qualifications
- Employment references
- Basic confirmation with employers of dates of employment and posts held

In the case of security staff, staff handling cash or high value assets, or those with access to critical operational elements of the site, all of the above checks will be undertaken together with additional checks.

15.2 Accreditation and Training

Members of the security team, including all 24-hour security personnel and contact canine handlers, will be subject to licensing by the Security Industry Authority (SIA). Not all casual stewards are required to be SIA registered, however they will all be provided with local training to increase the level of competence in Spectator Safety.

15.3 Briefing

Members of the security team and other staff engaged in the delivery of events and operation of commercial ventures will be provided with a briefing at the start of each tour of duty. This will include information relating to the prevailing threat levels and other relevant information. Managers and supervisors will be provided with training to ensure that the standard of briefing is appropriate.

16 Conclusions

This report sets out the security features and strategy which have informed the stadium design. This post submission report strategic aims remains extant from the previous design and reports. Extensive consultation has been undertaken with relevant statutory bodies including the Merseyside Police Counter Terrorist Security Advisor (CTSA) and Design Out Crime Officer to develop a robust strategy to minimise threats in accordance with current best practice and design.

The proposed changes to the submitted scheme are assessed to be compliant and moreover, provide further enhanced securing design and management features.

The application site at Bramley-Moore Dock already has existing locational features (River Mersey to the west; United Utilities Wastewater Treatment Plant to the north; and substantial granite-set Regent Road to the west) which provide a basis of design for security within the application site/scheme.

The report demonstrates that all aspects of security have been given the highest consideration and that qualified security consultants have informed the design from the earliest stages resulting in appropriate, agreed and effective mitigation measures and strategies. The security strategy includes, but is not limited to:

- Pedestrian and vehicle access control / screening, search and validation
- Hostile vehicle mitigation measures
- Surveillance
- Intruder detection
- Lighting
- Security control facilities
- Identification of the key threats and vulnerabilities identified in the Threat and Risk Assessment.

The response to threats does however continue to evolve and the scheme will continue to be assessed from an operational perspective in conjunction with the Club's own security team and management policies.

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