



Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

Crime Impact Statement

Former Pemberton Colliery, Foundry Lane, Wigan

202 no. Houses

For GL Hearn

Version A: 19/05/11

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Not Protectively Marked

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Former Pemberton Colliery, Foundry Lane, Wigan

202 no. Houses

2011/0358/CIS/01

For GL Hearn

Version A: 19/05/11

Executive Summary

- ☐ **Significant material changes are advised**
- ☒ **Proposal is satisfactory in principle but minor changes are advised**
- ☐ **Proposal is generally acceptable subject to the advice in this report**

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime. Particular consideration should be given to the following matters, which are discussed in more detail within this report:

- Pedestrian/cycle links to adjacent commercial development and surrounding open land
- Boundary definitions to dwellings, parking areas and edges of development
- Management & maintenance of public open spaces

If these concerns can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated, I would be happy to support the development.

I would encourage further dialogue with the applicant throughout the design and construction process to ensure the resulting development is secure. Please get in touch with Design for Security if you have any queries regarding the contents of this document, or the security standards referred to therein.



Bradley Hart *MTCP*

Design for Security Consultant

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1 Visual Audit



Photo 1

The site lies to the north-east of Foundry Lane and is currently formed by relatively flat open land (the former site of Pemberton Colliery). The southern portion of the site, adjacent to the existing residential properties on Foundry Lane and the densely vegetated land adjacent to Smithy Brook (known as Blundell's Wood), is proposed as a residential scheme comprising of 202 no. dwellings. The northern portion of the site is proposed as a mixed-use commercial estate, comprising of offices, industrial warehouses and large expanses of surface car parking. This portion of the site benefits from a resolution to grant outline planning permission, subject to finalising the related Section 106 agreement. The surrounding area is primarily residential in nature, punctuated by large areas of open space and commercial/industrial areas to the north-east.

Photos 2 & 3

The existing detached and semi-detached residential properties to the western end of Foundry Lane overlook the site itself. The proposed residential development will join to the end of the existing residential street – providing pedestrian access and emergency vehicular access only. Many of the existing dwellings back onto publicly accessible open space, which can provide the means to gain unauthorised hidden access to the rear of dwellings (if they are not adequately secured) and can provide easy access/escape routes for criminals.

Photos 4 to 6

Pemberton railway station lies to the north-west of the site, accessed off Billinge Road. The railway line itself runs along the northern edge of the site and underneath Little Lane to the north-east of the site.

Photo 7

There are high alleygates between/to the rear of the existing terraced housing to the north-west of the site, indicating there have been problems experienced with unauthorised access to the rear of dwellings.

Photos 8 & 9

There are some office buildings to the east of the site (Smithy Court and Beecham Court), accessed from a relatively new highway infrastructure, from which the proposed commercial and residential schemes will also be accessed. There is an existing access track which runs from Smithy Court across the open land to the south, which is currently gated to prevent unauthorised access through the adjacent commercial parking area.

2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st April 2010 and 2011.

2.1 Crime Count and Rate Comparison

Figure 1: Recorded Crime in Km² Centred on Site

Burglary Dwelling	Burglary Other	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Misc. Thefts	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Theft of Pedal Cycle
<20	<20	<20	20	<20	<20	<20	22	<20	<20

Figure 2: Comparison of Burglary Dwelling Rates at Site (Km²), LPA Area, and Greater Manchester



Figure 3: Comparison of Wounding Rates at Site (Km²), LPA Area, and Greater Manchester



Figure 4: Comparison of Criminal Damage Rates at Site (Km²), LPA Area, and Greater Manchester




Figure 5: Comparison of Vehicle Crime Rates at Site (Km²), LPA Area, and Greater Manchester



- 2.1.1 The volume of crime in the local area is low and this can be partly attributed to the large areas of open space and undeveloped land. When the rate of crime is examined, the local area suffers from lower crime rates than Wigan and Greater Manchester for all types of crimes, except those against vehicles.
- 2.1.2 The number of domestic burglaries per dwelling is **lower** than Wigan as a whole, and **lower** than Greater Manchester as a whole.
- 2.1.3 The number of woundings per dwelling is **lower** than Wigan as a whole, and **lower** than Greater Manchester as a whole.
- 2.1.4 Incidents of criminal damage per dwelling are **lower** than Wigan as a whole, and **lower** than Greater Manchester as a whole.
- 2.1.5 Incidents of vehicle crime per dwelling are **higher** than Wigan as a whole, and **lower** than Greater Manchester as a whole.

2.2 Burglary: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to burglary committed within a Km² centred on the site.

Figure 6: Burglary Dwelling – Day Range




Figure 7: Burglary Dwelling – Time Range





Figure 8: Burglary Dwelling – Point of Entry



- 2.2.1 **Day Range:** In the local area there were few incidents of burglary. Of the burglaries that have occurred, the majority have been on Friday, with a higher than average risk also experienced on Tuesday. Other days during the week suffer from a considerably lower risk/no risk at all.
- 2.2.2 **Time Range:** The risk of burglary in the local area is concentrated in the late evening and the early hours of the morning and peaks between 3am and 4am. It is likely that homes are targeted at these times when it is dark and offenders perceive the risk of being caught as low.
- 2.2.3 **Point of Entry:** In the majority of burglaries in the local area, access has been gained through front doors. Offenders have used both bodily pressure and tools to force open front doors. Rear doors have also been similarly targeted. Front and rear windows have been prised open with tools by offenders to gain entry.

2.3 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within a Km² centred on the site.

Figure 9: Vehicle Crime – Day Range





Figure 10: Vehicle Crime – Time Range



- 2.3.1 **Day Range:** The risk of vehicle crime in the local area is concentrated on Thursday and Friday, with a lower risk experienced on other days of the week. Vehicles are more routinely targeted when parked on residential streets.
- 2.3.2 **Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime in the local area is concentrated in the early hours of the morning, peaking at 3am. It is likely that vehicles are targeted over night, when it is dark and residents are likely to be asleep – resulting in a lower likelihood of detection.

2.4 Wounding: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to woundings committed within a Km² centred on the site.

Figure 11: Wounding – Day Range






Figure 12: Wounding – Time Range



- 2.4.1 **Day Range:** The risk of violence in the local area varies during the week, but is slightly higher between Thursday and Saturday than during the rest of the week. Levels of violence often increase at the weekend, when people attend licensed premises (often for longer periods) and consume more alcohol.
- 2.4.2 **Time Range:** The risk of violence during the day, increases late in the afternoon and into the evening. It is likely that violence is higher at these times when it is more likely that alcohol has been consumed within homes and licensed premises.

2.5 Criminal Damage: Breakdown

Figure 13: Criminal Damage Targets



The data below relates to criminal damage committed within a Km² centred on the site.

Criminal Damage Targets: Vehicles have been targeted more frequently than property by offenders. Frequent incidents of criminal damage include damage to vehicle and building windows, graffiti, arson and damage to vehicle bodywork.

2.6 Common Local M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.6.1 Front and rear doors being forced open with bodily pressure or tools

All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 6.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. All private spaces to the sides/rears of the dwellings should be robustly enclosed (see Section 6.5), particularly where adjacent to publicly accessible open space, to deter unauthorised access. Lighting to the front and rear of the buildings can also deter and reveal potential intruders, as well as reduce the fear of crime (see Section 7.2).

2.6.2 Windows to the front and rear of properties being prised open

All ground floor/accessible glazing should include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration (see Section 6.3). The windows themselves should also be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 6.2), with key operated locks and opening restrictors. Again, unauthorised access to the rear of the dwellings should be deterred by robust boundaries and the avoidance of open pedestrian routes to the rear of the properties.

2.6.3 Theft from vehicles and criminal damage to vehicles parked on residential streets overnight

It is essential that the development is designed so that residents vehicles are secured and overlooked. It is preferable that all dwellings either have the provision to garage vehicles or have in-curtilage gated parking arrangements, where residents can secure/clearly overlook their own vehicles. If this is absolutely unachievable, any rear parking courts should be small and gated to prevent unauthorised access to parked vehicles and the rear of dwellings, where they could be attacked unseen.

2.7 Local Crime Reduction Advisor (CRA) Comments

2.7.1 The local CRA for this division has stated that the existing residential properties opposite the site (particularly those backing onto Blundell Woods and adjacent to the public footpath) regularly report youths congregating in the wood and causing nuisance (i.e. noise, drinking etc.). The CRA has recommended that there are no more through-routes proposed to the woods/public footpath adjacent to the proposed dwellings and that all proposed boundary fences are of a quality and height to deter would-be intruders.

3 Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Domestic burglary
- Bogus callers and distraction burglary
- Criminal damage to dwellings and vehicles
- Anti-social behaviour
- Theft of/from parked vehicles
- Unauthorised access to buildings/private space
- Neighbour disputes
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

4 Design Considerations

The design and layout of your development will be appraised both in this document and through face-to-face meetings if and when required. Design for Security does recommend however that designers and developers refer to:

4.1 Safer Places (2004) ODPM, London

Seven attributes of sustainable communities that are particularly relevant to crime prevention are detailed within Chapter 2 of this ODPM publication. Annex 3 also contains many useful references. You can download 'Safer Places' at www.designforsecurity.org

4.2 Secured by Design (SBD)

Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

5 Design & Layout Appraisal

The proposal is to erect 202 no. 2 storey detached and semi-detached dwelling houses. Vehicles will access the site from Foundry Lane to the west and a new access road to the north-east (linking to Little Lane/Smithy Brook Road), which will run through the proposed commercial development to the north of the site. The dwellings will be arranged around a network of streets and cul-de-sacs and most will have garaged/in-curtilage parking arrangements. There are 3 no. areas of public open space proposed as part of the scheme and a number of pedestrian/cycle links to the proposed commercial development to the north and adjacent areas of open space to the south and east.


5.1 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

- 5.1.1 The proposed houses front onto the surrounding roads/access roads, resulting in good levels of surveillance of and from the dwellings. Many of the proposed dwellings on the edges of the development front towards adjacent areas of open space, rather than back onto them (which can leave dwellings vulnerable to rear access burglary).
- 5.1.2 The proposed houses all have habitable room windows to the front elevations (at ground floor level), maximising surveillance opportunities over the street, parked vehicles, areas of public open space and between dwellings. The design of the dwellings has been kept simple, with no front doors hidden in deep recesses or behind building lines (where they would be vulnerable to attack).

- 5.1.3 The majority of the properties will have garages and/or in-curtilage off-road parking spaces, allowing residents to secure/overlook their own vehicles and limiting opportunities to criminals. There are only two small parking courts proposed as part of the proposals, one to the front of the properties (where it can be well-overlooked) and one to the rear (which should be gated to prevent unauthorised access to the rear of dwellings and parked vehicles – see below).

5.2 Points for Further Consideration

- 5.2.1 Careful consideration should be given to the need for multiple pedestrian/cycle links to the commercial development to the north and the adjacent open space to the south and east, which can provide easy access/escape routes for criminals and leave adjacent dwellings and parked vehicles vulnerable to attack. It is also likely that such routes could be exploited by criminals to attack/escape from the adjacent proposed commercial buildings and large surface parking areas.
- 5.2.2 If such links to the commercial development to the north are considered absolutely necessary, I would recommend they are reduced in number to the minimum practicable (illustrated on the plan below), creating formalised, well-overlooked access points set well-away from any immediately adjacent properties or parking spaces. Limiting the number of connections can make a development less likely to attract crime (leaving criminals feeling more vulnerable to detection) without compromising permeability.



- 5.2.3 Given the information provided by the local CRA (see Section 2.7) in relation to the existing problems experienced in the locale, the proposed footpath/cycleway links to the south (linking to Smithy Brook) and east (linking to an adjacent residential area) of the development should be carefully considered. Where possible, it is always preferable not to have segregated routes for pedestrians, cyclists and vehicles. I would suggest that pedestrians/cyclists would be safer using the proposed/existing road network to access the areas to the east of the development, rather than a secluded footpath link that may foster crime and anti-social behaviour and could leave legitimate users vulnerable and intimidated. If the link to Smithy Brook to the south is to remain, it should be as straight and as wide as possible wide, with unimpeded views both of and along it, and it should also incorporate measures to deter unauthorised motorcycle access.
- 5.2.4 The dwellings on the edges of the scheme (i.e. adjacent to the commercial scheme to the north and areas of open space to the south and east) are a little remote and isolated from the rest of the development and will not benefit from as much natural surveillance - this may leave them perhaps more vulnerable than those located within the heart of the scheme. It is highly recommended that the edges of the development are defined by 1500mm high railings, deterring casual/uncontrolled access and limiting legitimate access to the formal links described above.

- 5.2.5 The robust management of the proposed areas of public open space is essential to encourage active use and enjoyment, whilst making abuse less likely to occur. Poor management and maintenance can lead to a downward spiral of neglect and loss of environmental quality, encouraging nuisance, vandalism and other anti-social or criminal behaviour. All areas should be well-overlooked, with planting that does not impede natural surveillance and no hard/soft landscaping features that may encourage loitering/gathering close to dwellings. Immediately adjacent properties (e.g. Plot 138) should be protected by dense, low-level defensive planting beds to discourage access close to properties/boundaries.
- 5.2.6 The boundary treatments to the dwellings are vitally important to secure them, any parked vehicles and prevent unauthorised access to private spaces (see Section 6.5) – particularly where rear boundaries abut publicly accessible space. Belts of defensive planting should be incorporated to prevent unauthorised access/damage to accessible rear boundaries and blank gable walls to detached garages.
- 5.2.7 Any driveways/garages provided to the rear of individual properties (e.g. at Plots 15, 17 etc.), where vehicles would be hidden from view from the residents themselves, should be incorporated into the rear gardens of the dwellings behind fencing/vehicular gates (see Section 6.5).
- 5.2.8 I would be concerned if the rear parking court serving Plots 34-39 is to be left open and accessible to all, leaving the parked vehicle and the rear of dwellings vulnerable, where they could be attacked unseen from the street. The rear parking court must be robustly enclosed and gated to prevent unauthorised access (see Section 6.5) and there should be no visitor spaces provided in this area. The front parking court serving Plots 148-151 should have a different surface colour/texture from the street, encouraging a feeling of territoriality among residents and psychologically giving the impression the area is private, discouraging access to anyone without a purpose from entering.
- 5.2.9 It is essential that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in residents and visitors.

6 Physical Security

The following standards and features will be required for this development to demonstrate a level of physical security acceptable to Design for Security.

6.1 Doors

- 6.1.1 Front and rear doors to dwellings must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, WCL2, or LPS 1175 SR2. Any external french/double doors or sliding doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24.
- 6.1.2 Front doors to properties should have fixed external handles or split spindles, meaning access is only possible with a key. They should also have either fixed sidelights or door viewers. Chain limiters are recommended but not generally essential. Letterboxes within doors must be located a minimum of 400mm away from internal handle and locking hardware.
- 6.1.3 Garage doors (if there is a connecting internal door with the dwelling) must be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR1. Alternatively, the internal connecting door must be to the same burglary resistant specification as the front door (normally BS PAS 24).

6.2 Windows

- 6.2.1 Windows must be compliant with and certified to BS 7950.
- 6.2.2 Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

6.3 Glazing

- 6.3.1 Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 0.4mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 6.4mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P1A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

6.4 Alarms

- 6.4.1 If an alarm is installed then it should comply with either:
- BS EN 50131 and PD 6662 for wired systems
 - BS 6799 for wireless systems
- 6.4.2 The alarm should be linked to contacts on all external doors (including internal doors into garages) and PIR detectors in all ground floor rooms with windows.
- 6.4.3 If an alarm is not to be provided, there should be a 13amp, non-switched fuse spur to allow future residents to connect an alarm.

6.5 Boundaries

- 6.5.1 The sides (including gables up to the front building line) and rears of the properties should generally be enclosed with 2100mm high walls or robust close-boarded timber fencing. Rear boundaries that are adjacent to public space should have a masonry (or other hardwearing) base. Sub-divisional rear boundaries should be 1500-1800mm high. Any side gates to private space should be fitted with either a pad-lockable bolt (to the mid-point of the internal face) or a key operable deadlock.
- 6.5.2 The rear parking court serving Plots 34-39 should be enclosed with 2100mm high automatic vehicular gates, operated by a key fob/proximity reader system with no automatic egress (i.e. access control both 'in' and 'out') so that criminals cannot gain access to the areas, attack the vehicles and escape. There should be no centrally located horizontal bars to aid climbing and the gates should be located away from other climbing aids, such as low walls, street lights etc. The hinges should also not provide footholds and the gap at the bottom of the gates should be small enough to stop anyone crawling through. If double gates are used, they should overlap when closed and should not be capable of being forced open.
- 6.5.3 Any communal pedestrian gate to the rear parking court or communal rear access alleyways should be self-closing and 'slam to lock' (i.e. an automatic deadlocking mortice latch, key operated from both sides), which cannot be left unlocked when shut.
- 6.5.4 The rear boundaries to gardens adjacent to any rear parking court (i.e. Plots 37, 39 & 41) could be 1800mm high and should be partially visually permeable (e.g. 1200mm solid panel with 600mm integrated robust trellis above) to allow some surveillance through. Gates into the rear curtilages of dwellings should be in keeping with the height of adjacent boundary treatments and should be lockable from both sides (i.e. with a key operable deadlock), to allow residents access to/from the parking court.
- 6.5.5 Any vehicular gates to the rear curtilages of dwellings should also be 2100mm high and lockable from both sides.
- 6.5.6 The fronts of properties should be demarcated by low-level railings to an approximate height of 1200mm. Any low boundaries that adjoin high boundaries should have transition panels/sections to prevent the low boundary being used as a climbing aid over the higher.

7 External Features

7.1 Landscaping

- 7.1.1 In vulnerable locations such as entrances, parking areas and footpaths, low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height, and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2m from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better, make a rational choice of routes and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.
- 7.1.2 Loose surface materials in the publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).
- 7.1.3 Planting must be avoided that will aid climbing over boundary treatments. The security of fences can be compromised if trees or street furniture are placed close by.
- 7.1.4 There should be no hard landscaping that could inadvertently create seating or loitering spots (except within secure designated or otherwise-controlled areas). These features can encourage anti-social behaviour and raise the fear of crime.

7.2 Lighting

- 7.2.1 Lighting to all roads and footpaths should be to adoptable standards (BS 5489). Lighting to any communal parking areas should also be in accordance with BS 5489 and display an average lux level of 20, with a uniformity level of no less than 25%.
- 7.2.2 External lighting must be provided to the front and rear of dwellings, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor (manual override is also permissible). PIR security lighting is not recommended for these locations and should not be employed unless advised.
- 7.2.3 Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.
- 7.2.4 Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary treatments. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.

7.3 Communal Areas

- 7.3.1 Any public open space or amenity areas not under the ownership of residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings. Any such spaces that are left open and ill-defined can attract loitering/gathering and anti-social behaviour if it is not clear who owns or controls them. Low-level defensive planting beds can be used to great effect to funnel pedestrians away from vulnerable areas (such as rear garden boundaries, blank gable walls or parking bays).

7.4 Other

- 7.4.1 Meter cupboards should be located to the fronts of properties only, not in the private areas, in order to deter bogus callers.
- 7.4.2 Any rainwater pipes should be square in profile and fixed back to the building fabric to prevent climbing to upper floor windows.
- 7.4.3 Any communal cycle stores should be secure, lockable enclosures. For further information refer to our cycle storage guidance document: http://www.designforsecurity.org/uploads/files/DFS_Cycles.pdf
- 7.4.4 Any communal bin stores should be secure, lockable, and fire resistant enclosures. A strategy should be defined to ensure waste collection can take place whilst retaining a secure development.

8 Management & Maintenance

The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as 'the broken window theory'. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:

- Litter/graffiti removal
- Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls)
- Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees

9 Construction

Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.

For further information regarding site security, please contact your local Crime Reduction Advisor, **Wendy O'Neil**, on **0161 856 7320**.

A Contact register

Date	Contact	Summary of Contact
21 st April 2011	GL Hearn	Receipt of CIS instruction & site plan
10 th May 2011	GL Hearn	Email sent to Agent requesting more info/plans
12 th May 2011	GL Hearn	Additional plans received from Agent
17 th – 18 th May 2011	GL Hearn	Email correspondence with Agent re: timescale for completion of CIS report

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

DWG No.	DWG Title	Date	Rev
420/DPL 01	DRAFT Planning Layout (SUPERSEDED)	Apr 2011	A
420/PL 00	Planning Layout	May 2011	B
416/AYC/02	The Aycliffe (Semi-Detached) Planning Drawing – Classic	June 2010	-
416/BAR/01	The Barwick (Detached) Planning Drawing – Classic	June 2010	-
416/BAR/02	The Barwick (Semi-Detached) Planning Drawing – Classic	June 2010	-
416/BAR/03	The Barwick (Three Block) Planning Drawing – Classic	June 2010	-
416/FAR/01	The Farington (Detached) Planning Drawing – Classic	June 2010	-
416/GUI2/01	The Guisborough2 (Detached) Planning Drawing – Classic	June 2010	-
416/LIN/01	The Lincoln (Detached) Planning Drawing – Classic	June 2010	-
416/TAV/01	The Tavistock (Detached) Planning Drawing – Classic	June 2010	-
416/YOR/01	The York (Detached) Planning Drawing – Classic	June 2010	-

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Status	Revisions Made
A	<input type="checkbox"/> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS 3621, 2007

Thief resistant locks. Key Egress.

The minimum standard for locks on external or entrance doors to be acceptable to the Association of British Insurers (ABI) and the police service. The effectiveness of the lock also depends on the quality of the door, frame and other hardware which is not tested by this standard and which may fail before the lock.

BS 8621, 2007

Thief resistant locks. Keyless Egress.

Same as above, but egress is possible without a key (by use of thumb turn or latch lever).

BS 7950, 1997

Specification for enhanced security performance of casement and tilt/turn windows.

BS 4873, 2005: Specification for aluminium windows.

BS 7412, 2007: Specification for plastic windows made from PVC-U extruded hollow profiles.

BS 644-1, 2003: Wood windows. Specification for factory assembled windows - various types.

BWF:TWAS: Timber window accreditation scheme.

BS 6510, 2005: Specification for steel windows, sills, window boards & doors.

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door assemblies.

A performance standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2007

General security performance requirements for door assemblies.

An attack test standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door, frame, lock and hardware set has withstood a series of physical tests. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- Resistance of glazing
- Performance of hardware
- Resistance to static loading
- Resistance to dynamic loading
- Burglary resistance by manual intervention

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

(Learn more at www.designforsecurity.org/about/cpted)

CRA

Crime Reduction Advisor. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

NPT

Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk